Posted: March 24th, 2022
The Role of Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) in Identifying Potential Maritime Security Threats in the Red Sea
The Role of Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) in Identifying Potential Maritime Security Threats in the Red Sea
1. Introduction
Open-Source intelligence (OSINT) which is a term used to refer to the method of collecting data from any publicly available source, is often the most viable means of information gathering during times of restricted security in an area of interest. OSINT can provide valuable data for evaluation of maritime security exists in an area of interest and it can assist in identification of potential threats to security. By knowing the security environment and by understanding the relative threats to security, resources can be allocated to prevent or mitigate security threats. OSINT methods are varied and range from the searching of internet databases to taking photographs or video of an event of interest. OSINT methodology is a growing field in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the global war on terror with the most recent conflicts highlighting its importance as a valuable method of information gathering. OSINT methods have already been applied on many occasions to the assessment of security threats and risk analysis for offshore energy operations. This method of assessment consists of data collection on the region and the development of a detailed yet, user friendly “intelligence pack” which summarises the security threats and their respective locations. An assessment of this type may set the precedent for further security assessment by identifying and clearly highlighting security threats to energy companies with business interests in the region.
Maritime security threats represent a major danger to both national and international security levels. As modern technology is increasing in open, research and development, the newer technology fully automated freighters and more advanced bonded container systems are not likely substantial advancements in offshore development from previous and current energy levels. The recent threat to attack a Saudi oil tanker unloading crude oil at Mina al-Bakr has prompted an immediate response from the Iraqi interim government to provide protection for ships in the Persian Gulf that have come under frequent attack in recent months. It is of interest to review the recently published data, but a full assessment of the impact of these new technologies is likely to be more useful in future years when the new technology is better represented in new construction. This assessment will discuss the trends and impacts of newer maritime transportation technology to offshore development.
1.1 Background
North-east Africa, and especially the Red Sea region, remains important to global trade due to its proximity to Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. It is known as one of the world’s most important sea routes, linking the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal. However, the region is fraught with security concerns, which have increased since the 9/11 attacks. Analysts remain worried that the next terrorist attack will involve a WMD. The U.S., for example, has been increasing its military presence in the Horn of Africa in attempts to combat potential threats. In order to properly understand the security environment of the Red Sea, it is important to identify the various factors which influence it. This is known as situation awareness. By understanding the situation at present, it may be possible to prevent potential security threats in the future. OSINT is especially useful in attempting to understand the situation of a given area. By using unclassified evidence, it is possible to create a picture of the situation which is required for intelligence to be useful. This form of intelligence has been suggested for use by governments in attempts to understand the security environment of the Mediterranean. The success of OSINT in this project may act as a case study for future application in the Red Sea.
1.2 Research Objectives
Finally, the study will provide an assessment of the current and future maritime security situation in the Red Sea. By drawing on the findings from the first two objectives, it will attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the security environment, using this to predict any future trends and assessing what these mean for the safety of shipping. By doing this, the study aims to provide a valuable resource for those involved in the shipping industry in the Red Sea, and help to raise awareness of the security threats and risks.
Secondly, this study aims to assess the effectiveness of open-source intelligence in monitoring maritime security in the Red Sea. This will involve comparing OSINT’s capabilities with more traditional methods of intelligence gathering and attempting to identify any gaps which may hinder its effectiveness. This will help to show whether OSINT is a viable method for monitoring maritime security, and identify any areas for improvement.
The primary objective of this study is to better understand the threats faced by shipping in the Red Sea, as well as the various actors responsible. The study will achieve this by categorising the different types of actors and threats, and then analysing the interaction between them. This will help to provide a clearer picture of the maritime security environment in the Red Sea, and identify the main areas of risk.
1.3 Significance of the Study
Thus, the overall aim of this research is to use open source intelligence currently to identify potential maritime security threats to the Red Sea and to understand and create a methodology suitable for using open source intelligence in the future to monitor and learn about new and evolving security threats in the maritime domain. This research will first and foremost create an extensive understanding and knowledge of the Red Sea and all related security threats to date. It will enable different methods and tools of data mining and analysis and create a framework for the systematic process of identifying and monitoring security threats in the maritime domain. This methodology may then be useful to an OSINT practitioner in the field of maritime security, who could have a very broad area of intelligence to sift through and may be overwhelmed by the amount of data. This research will provide a guide on the best methods and which tools to use. An intelligence methodology will also be open to further assessment and improvement based on the progress and findings in this field.
Security in the Red Sea has strong implications in the lives of people living in the surrounding countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt, as both these countries are heavily reliant on the Suez Canal for trade purposes. Any sort of security threat in the Red Sea would have disastrous implications and knowing that the maritime domain is quite different from the land domain, it is essential to increase focus on maritime security. The term ‘maritime security’ is quite broad and encompasses everything from smuggling and illegal immigration to terrorism and armed conflict, all of which are applicable threats to the Red Sea. Therefore, with a specific focus on potential security threats to the Red Sea, one could use open source intelligence to gather and analyze information on the past history of maritime security incidents in the Red Sea, the different methods and tactics that were used, the perpetrators and their motives, resulting in a clearer understanding of the security threats to the Red Sea and the best possible ways to prevent or counter them.
2. Literature Review
The last decade has seen a rapid increase in the application of OSINT to various security problems, but the method is still not fully understood. Smith and Varona believe the varied and recent expansion of the method required a clearer understanding of what it is and how it functions. This is even more apparent with regards to applications in the maritime security field. A study by Dryden identified the need for a focused body of research to be dedicated to using OSINT to support the maritime domain awareness concept. Any research in this area must be well-documented and focus on clear applications of the method to intelligence end-products. Failure to do this may result in OSINT being grouped with other intelligence methods and its benefits ignored.
The importance of OSINT and its effectiveness compared to other forms of intelligence gathering has been highlighted by several authors. Janes asserts OSINT has always been available to intelligence organizations, but its importance grew following the end of the Cold War, due to the changing nature of intelligence requirements. A study by the US commission on intelligence, highlighting intelligence failures in Iraq and the War on Terror, stressed the need for greater utilization of open sources to support national security requirements. OSINT’s importance lies in its ability to adapt to changing intelligence requirements while still providing decision advantage. Its cost-effectiveness and lack of perceived political bias make it a highly attractive proposition when compared to other intelligence methods. Due to a global economic downturn and reduced defense spending, budgetary constraints have meant intelligence organizations are now required to do “more with less.” This has led to a downsizing in HUMINT and SIGINT operations, further increasing the relative importance of OSINT.
Research literature from the fields of intelligence studies, security, and others was consulted to establish a foundation and framework for open source intelligence and its use in the identification of potential maritime security threats in the Red Sea. This was necessary as OSINT is a relatively new method of intelligence collection, and as such, the underlying concepts required explanation. Until recently, open source intelligence was not a widely known concept. Facts on International Relations and Politics defined it as “intelligence produced from publicly available information and disseminated to the appropriate policymakers… for the purpose of addressing a specific national security requirement.” This definition still holds true today, the only difference being in the amount of information available and the vast number of resources now open and available to intelligence analysts. This is further reinforced by Birkler, who states “open source information is omnipresent and growing” and provides another definition in calling OSINT “a method of using open sources and analytical techniques to gather information to produce an intelligence end-product.”
2.1 Definition and Importance of Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)
The definition and importance of OSINT, whether in general or in specific terms like its importance in maritime security, can be considered as an approach to collecting information of any kind that is available to the general public and can serve an intelligence purpose. OSINT is defined as intelligence that is derived from an original source and is usually available to the public. OSINT activities are the form of method or technique used to get information from the public. The information is acquired through the use of various techniques such as web-based search engines, content available on the internet, public data, cooperation with the public, using various online communities, videos or photos, interviews, and many more. This information should be recorded into structured reports as needed by the customer. OSINT activities can be taken either in active or passive form. In the active form, the information is targeted and obtained through social interaction on the developed information source. In the passive form, the information is obtained by monitoring any available information without taking any action towards the information source. OSINT reports should convey new information to the customer. OSINT aims to gain decision advantage for decision makers based on the acquired information. Usually, in the intelligence cycle, information is a primary resource that can provide decision advantage in decision making and action. Intelligence from particular information can provide a recommended action to a problem, and the decision maker can determine a final decision based on the recommended action. The final decision can affect the situation or environment related to the problem, and the decision maker can monitor the situation changes and take new intelligence to reloop the intelligence cycle. OSINT is very crucial because it serves an information requirement for the decision maker, and usually, the decision maker can get the information directly compared to other intelligence methods. A decision maker can determine an action and monitor the situation in the short time cycle, and OSINT can provide the decision advantage in the short time-frame before taking the next action and comparing the situation changes with the new information. In some cases, OSINT can be the only method to get information for a specific problem, and it is effective for decision makers who are concerned about public security, both national and international. OSINT can also be used by intelligence or security corporations to evaluate situation and environment changes and take preventive action based on potential problems in public or government security.
2.2 Application of OSINT in Maritime Security
Application in OSINT in maritime security:
Until the 9/11 attacks, there was little interest in OSINT in the context of national security. The 9/11 attacks propelled intelligence agencies around the world to better harness and integrate OSINT as a valuable medium to obtain information. An official inquiry was set up to review the intelligence issues before the 9/11 attacks and the extent to which the US government’s policy priorities and resource allocation were skewed by the intelligence community’s inability to provide well-grounded assessments of the threats and opportunities. In turn, the quality of information in the intelligence process. The chairman of the inquiry, Thomas Kean, said the biggest surprise was how the intelligence community was using OSINT. It was established that intelligence agencies had been accustomed to dispatching commands for information and not searching for it themselves. An effective weapon of mass influence had been overlooked. With a budget of $30 million per annum prior to and after the 9/11 attacks, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) within the US Department of State has demonstrated a profound understanding of the nature of intelligence and the effectiveness of a solid OSINT foundation. Most recently, it is evident the change in US policy to acknowledge the potential of OSINT in understanding critical areas of the world. In 2006 and 2007, the US government funded an Open Source Centre (OSC) with an annual budget of $462.54 million. The OSC acts as the intelligence adjunct to analyze information available to the public in an effort to better support national and homeland security consumers.
2.3 Previous Studies on OSINT and Maritime Security in the Red Sea
In the realm of academic studies, one official report from the United States Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) entitled “Iran’s Naval Forces: A Tale of Two Navies” does contain a small section on Iranian utilization of open-source intelligence in the form of translated Western naval publications and analyses to gain information about potential adversaries. This in itself falls somewhat short of the basic OSINT definition signifying information collected from overt, open access public sources, but nonetheless does highlight the integral necessity of naval forces to seek information from foreign sources, whether openly acquired or otherwise. In it, a case study focusing on an incident in 1991 where Iranian intelligence specialists successfully identified and predicted a gap in US naval coverage of the Arabian Gulf mine warfare situation, using acquired American documentation and knowledge of their heavy reliance on automated search methods to conclude that mine field locations were no longer being updated, resulting in an unsanctioned Iranian visit and sampling of a US naval mine, gains notable mention. Whilst specific details regarding the exact intelligence acquisition methods and sources are not revealed, the very nature of the conclusion strongly suggests a form of intelligence unit derived from deduction of information from allied publications, with foreign mined the area in question being a source of information and the deduction having been a hypothesis based on tracked US naval movement and activity, refined and verified through the incursion itself. Though not purely OSINT, the incident serves as a clear example of intelligence in action using a full range of acquired information to reach a solid conclusion and resultant course of action.
2.4 Gaps in the Existing Literature
There are significant gaps in the existing literature of OSINT and its role in identifying potential maritime security threats in the Red Sea. To date, no known study has been conducted specifically on OSINT and its role in identifying potential maritime security threats in the Red Sea. As a result, the success stories and application of OSINT on the more global scale topic of maritime security and even on more specific cases such as piracy off the coast of Somalia can only be inferred and not considered relative. An analysis of what information is available, how it was obtained and the methods used in its collection to identify potential security threats in an area and further how this information was used to validate those threats is not present within current literature. This includes comparative analysis on the cost, time and manpower resources required to locate, interpret and take action on intelligence information through both open source and traditional classified means. With the multiple options of information sources, the potential partnerships and various methods that it can be employed to receive timely, accurate, and relevant information in regards to maritime security threats, an in-depth case study is needed to determine how OSINT can effectively be applied to specific scenarios on a varying level of success. Finally, there is no literature on the legal and ethical aspects of employing OSINT to gather information on security threats and the potential for using open source information in a court of law to either defend or prosecute a case. This is an important factor considering the increasing reliance on open source information by many governments and intelligence agencies to determine threats and a subsequent increase in the amount of information that has been falsified to provoke a response, misunderstood, or taken out of context.
3. Methodology
The methodology is a prototype to develop a method to identify security threats in the Red Sea using open source information. The data looks at recent security incidents, assesses the who, what, where and when of each incident, patterns of activity prior to incident, and finally identify indicators that are discernable to a wider range of potential activities. The idea is to work with recent incidents in focused geographic areas to identify events pre-event or indicators to specific deviations towards threatening behavior. This in turn would provide a potential list of activities and indicators that could be later applied in a wider quantitative study.
A basic quantitative analysis of number and type of activity will also be completed against a control dataset. Logically if a threat is usually a deviation from normal activity type, then identifying the normal activity type is essential. For the sake of simplicity “number” will not be a specific indicator to threat, rather a higher number of the same type of activity or a single event with multiple types of related activity is more likely to be classified as a threat.
A second key component of this methodology is identifying potential data sources and developing techniques to automatically identify and extract relevant information. This is essential to any intelligence analysis work, as large manual data collection is too costly and inefficient.
This methodology is a fundamental work in progress and likely to evolve with findings and repeat applications. At this stage it is designed to be a prototype for later application in a wider RMC project on worldwide maritime security threats.
3.1 Research Design
The research design, networking and qualitative case study analysis, was deemed appropriate to the form of research as it allowed for the exploration of the experiences and roles of organisations in the securitisation of the Red Sea and the surrounding maritime areas. These are complex phenomena that are best explored through ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, and the case study is well established in the social sciences as a valuable method of inquiry when the researcher wants to understand some contextual or social phenomenon, and its boundaries are not clearly defined. In order to maintain a semblance of structure to the research potential cases were identified beforehand through secondary data in the form of reports, and newspapers and seeking expert opinion. This allowed for the subsequent purposive snowball sampling to determine respondents and key informants. This should allow for both typical and atypical cases to be compared and thereby increase the potential explanations. Snowball sampling, a technique often used in security based intelligence gathering, proved highly efficient allowing for the author to reach primary respondents in a relatively short space of time. Public records were used as a supplemental source of verification and evidence. This approach was designed to allow for theory to be derived from the evidence collected. Central to all of this was the use author’s existing networks where in many instances there are already ongoing relationships with representatives of the organisations being studied. This provided a simple and efficient access method as it was often possible to secure a respondent within a single phone call or email. Given the planned non-linear movement between data gathering and analysis, it is hoped that verbal consent to follow up and potentially clarify positive or negative findings will be granted. This may allow for quality checks that might be impossible in conventional research.
What is the essential research design, and why is it deemed appropriate to this form of research?
3.2 Data Collection
The original stance of this research proposed to use data mining methods to establish a pattern of regular traffic for areas around Yemen and Sudan. This involved establishing a large database for all civilian and commercial vessels 300GT and above leaving port and logging their Automatic Information System (AIS) data. Unfortunately, there has been an AIS data blackout on such locations, and only shipping with a high-security insurance premium has been tracked. Steps were then made to gather fishing fleet data; however, the broadness of fishing strategies make it impossible to track on such a small scale. Ultimately, it was decided to use online open-source intelligence resources to establish a current picture of who uses the Red Sea, where activity is occurring, and its political background. On this premise, much data was still to be gathered. This being said, progression in the area of intelligence on vehicle locations and imagery has meant that much military, diplomatic, and politically based activity concerning the Red Sea is open to scrutiny in ways it wouldn’t have been in the past.
Vehicle locations surrounded by the Red Sea can potentially suggest routes or destinations. With so many small secondary ports and little tracking of fishing vessels, it is easy for any maritime traffic to go unnoticed. For example, in 2002, the MV Limburg was struck by a small boat laden with explosives. The incident wasn’t an act of terrorism; however, the ship was boarded illegally, and an attack on a tanker in the confined waters of the Red Sea is not an unlikely prospect. Fishing, unenforced UN embargoes, and ongoing conflict in Sudan create enough activity to mask preparation for a terror attack. Step one to assessing the clandestine maritime security threats in this region is to establish who is, in fact, moving where and why.
3.3 Data Analysis
The analytical process consisted of the following steps: selection of data, the development of threat scenarios, and the identification of patterns. These OSINT methods were chosen as data collection for the maritime domain can present a number of difficulties due to the vast amount of information available, some of which will be of little intelligence value. However, consuming large amounts of resources to access, and the ability for threats to be asymmetric and constantly changing. Therefore, an intelligence-driven approach can be costly and ineffective. With specific reference to the Red Sea, requirements to conduct intelligence activities without alerting the states in the region create a secretive nature to intelligence activity. This, coupled with the closed and restricted nature of governmental maritime information and the scale of the maritime domain, makes current intelligence practice most inefficient. OSINT methods are often seen as the solution to these problems due to the accessibility of data which it utilizes and the possibilities for conducting intelligence activities from offshore without alerting potential adversaries.
3.4 Limitations of the Study
This study is purely based on unclassified information, which might not provide comprehensive explanation on the threats. Due to its open nature, some of the research conducted for this study may not reflect the true situation of the environment. Inaccuracy and issue of credibility arise from too much open source such as the case of Yemen which is not possible for the researcher to find the latest information due to security situation which is very severe. In this case, the research may also suffer surfacing validity problem. This is due to the inability of the researcher to support the information with verified information. Last limitation of this study is lack of access to commercial intelligence software and data. With only a tools that might provide general information that is available to public most of the software, which is quite sophisticated, this research may fail to paint a clear picture on the environment of the Red Sea and the true nature of security threats in the maritime environment.
3.4. Limitation of the Study
The methodology described in Chapter 3 is aimed at helping us to understand how OSINT can help in tracking the potential security threat in the Red Sea, through information about maritime environment and characteristics of potential security threats in the environment.
4. Findings and Analysis
Given the scope of this essay, the findings and analysis presented will be limited to an overview of potential maritime security threats in the Red Sea, and a brief evaluation of OSINT’s effectiveness in the region. The threat to maritime security in the Red Sea is an ongoing and dynamic phenomenon. It is influenced by a wide array of interrelated factors including regional politics, social unrest, the pervasiveness of transnational militant groups, and the struggle for natural resources. The region is also of global strategic importance due to the Suez Canal. For the purpose of this essay, maritime security threats will be taken to encompass any act of violence, coercion, or instigation intended to damage a state’s sovereignty, security, or public interests at sea. With the intent to distinguish maritime security from the realm of safety incidents, which are generally caused by accidental or environmental factors, but could actually escalate to conflicts based on inadequate management of the safety events. So, the key point is the level of risk for future attacks.
Moving to the analysis of potential maritime security threats, we shall first consider the traditional threats posed by the state and its armed forces. In general, in the post-Cold War era, there is a worldwide retreat from power politics and conflicts, and increased efforts to solve disputes and increase mutual confidence in security, particularly in regions of tension. This is strongly reflected in the Red Sea, where the primary reason for warfare in recent history has been to further national interests in regional disputes. The most common form of force employment has been blockades taken to hinder or disrupt shipping of the opposing state, which is a pinpoint to a security threat. Such tactics were employed by the Egyptian armed forces during the Yemen civil war (1962-70) and the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict (1998-2000), both in attempts to further national interests and to prevent respective enemy reinforcement.
4.1 Overview of Potential Maritime Security Threats in the Red Sea
Maritime security is a critical issue for much of the world, and especially for geostrategically important regions. The Red Sea is no exception. Threats to security in the Red Sea both stem from and contribute to wider regional instability. The many threats and issues present in the Red Sea and its environs are of great import to those concerned with the state of regional and international security. Those concerned with security in the Red Sea have a large number of issues to contend with. Not only is the threat to maritime security in terms of human (or state) security great, but the issues form part of a wider tapestry of regional instability and potential wider conflict. Issues such as weapons proliferation and trade in conflict resources aggravate extant inter-state tensions and are a conduit for wider conflict. Terrorism is a threat to both state and human security, and its threat hovers over the issue of the Sudanese civil war and the potential conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
There are also a multitude of non-state actors, some of whom are little more than criminal gangs, which threaten the security of Red Sea states and the safety of vessels travelling in the area. Issues of environmental security, while not of direct import to this report, are closely related to the general security of the Red Sea. The environment is both a cause for and a victim of conflict, and undermining the security of the area will hinder international efforts to protect and preserve the unique and diverse ecosystem of the Red Sea. The vast coral reefs, which are a valuable resource for all the Red Sea states, would be at risk from acts of war and even the activities of fishermen using explosives or poisons to increase their catch.
4.2 Utilizing OSINT for Threat Identification and Assessment
The aim of successfully identifying and assessing the potential security threats in the maritime sector is a highly complex and many-sided issue. The employing of OSINT collection techniques to assist in the identification and assessment of potential threats is an exceptionally useful tool. OSINT enables the gathering of information from a wide variety of sources, making it possible to collect large quantities of relevant, up-to-date information on any given subject. Threat identification and assessment in the maritime sector can be divided into two sections. The first is the identification of any intended threat to ships and port facilities, and the second is the assessment of any potentially hazardous situation that could lead to any form of accident or attack. In either instance, the employing of OSINT collection and analysis techniques to compile intelligence information on potential threats is an exceptionally useful tool.
With the information available from OSINT sources, it is possible to conduct a threat assessment based on the reliability and validity of the information collected. It is also possible to identify the credibility of the sources from which the information was collected. High credibility information from reliable sources is vital to understanding potential threats and taking preventative action. Finally, the information that was used to identify and assess threats can be shared and compared with other organizations who are involved in similar activities with the aim of preventing any possible intelligence failures in threat assessments.
4.3 Case Studies: Successful Implementation of OSINT in Maritime Security
A case study provides an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 2003, p.13). The case study method is well established in a number of social science disciplines including international relations, and it is often a preferred method as it enables an in-depth investigation to take place of the case in question. The case study method is particularly useful in examining a complex issue, and is often preferred over other methods due to its rigor and comprehensiveness (George and Bennett, 2005, p.5). Case studies can be used in both within-case and cross-case analysis. The former is used in investigating a single case in depth, and the latter is used to compare cases with one another to draw out common patterns. In this chapter, we use the case study method in investigating a within-case of the successful implementation of OSINT in maritime security in the Red Sea. This method is undertaken in order to provide a detailed description of the case in question and to examine the effectiveness of OSINT in cases of maritime security in the Red Sea.
4.4 Evaluation of OSINT’s Effectiveness in the Red Sea
OSINT has also shown the ability to identify and assess threats to the marine environment in the Red Sea, such as the potential for oil spills with severe ecological and economic repercussions. High-resolution satellite imagery has been used to monitor shipping activity at the straits of Bab el Mandeb and the Suez Canal, areas which have witnessed acts of piracy in recent times, in addition to international terrorist incidents. Data gained from imagery and other open-source information has been used to assess the level of threat to shipping in these areas and provide a basis to recommend adequate security measures.
The case of the arms shipment interdicted in January 2002 was particularly good a display of how OSINT provided intelligence on an identified threat. The capture of the Victoria and its weapons cache demonstrated the potential threat to shipping from weapons proliferation originating in the region. OSINT provided information on the high levels of military spending in the nations surrounding the Red Sea and weapons proliferation between states. The cargoes exiting Sudan for both northern and southern forces, and ongoing ethnic conflicts have the potential to bring violence to merchant traffic and other non-combatant shipping.
Evaluation of OSINT’s effectiveness in the Red Sea: OSINT is proving to be an ever more effective and important tool in the area of threat identification and assessment. Through the successful identification of known Red Sea threats, and the discovery of new ones, utilizing methods discussed in the previous chapter, evidence suggests that OSINT has the potential to provide strong intelligence on potential maritime security threats for states in the region.
5. Conclusion and Recommendations
The developed framework has re-emphasised the importance of open-source intelligence in identifying potential maritime security threats in the Red Sea for this decade and beyond. This approach enables understanding substantial elements of threats and takes shape by utilising information technology in identifying and analysing factors that contributed to potential security threat. It has investigated the customary practices and legal regimes for securing maritime transportation of oil which focused on international shipping lanes and straits used for oil transportation. Future research should analyse the implications of changes to international law on the transportation of oil by sea and its bearing on the security of particular regions, and the development of a monitoring system to assess how such threats take shape over time in order to give timely advice to policy makers. The findings and conclusions of this research will provide valuable information to several maritime communities to safeguard their resources from potential security threats, especially on oil transportation in the Red Sea. The utilisation of OSINT has provided extensive information and its correlation to the existing intelligence systems has cultivated an intelligent decision-making process to influence policy makers in taking proactive measures for their national interests.
5.1 Summary of Findings
The implementation of the model with nine different types of maritime threats classified into specific areas in the Red Sea has enabled a clearer understanding of the threat types present in this region. This model can be easily updated with new or additional information and be applied to any future OSINT information discovered, giving analysts a consistent and efficient method to identify potential threats to Red Sea maritime security. Through extensive research, it can be considered that the Red Sea is currently a high-profile area for acts of inter-state aggression and low-intensity conflict such as insurgency, with an apparent spill over from the instability in the Horn of Africa. This can be seen with the Houthi movement in Yemen and an instance of a Saudi flagged vessel being fired upon by the Houthi forces in recent times. Incidents of maritime terrorism also demonstrate a significant threat to Red Sea security, with an attempted attack on an Egyptian gas installation further confirming this notion. Any of these threat types have the potential to escalate, leading way to an increased chance of high-scale conflict between regional states and even intervention from external powers. Although the probability of threat events materializing into a large-scale conflict may be currently low, it is apparent that the severity of consequences is high, making it of concern to both the regional and international community.
5.2 Implications for Maritime Security Practices
OSINT is also effective in mapping out the dynamics of a criminal act, identifying the method, motives, and timing of an event which can ultimately prevent the act from occurring. This involves intelligence analysis and exploitation of a specific part of intelligence, something which is difficult for intelligence from classified resources to do. OSINT can also assist in the allocation and prioritization of security resources in an efficient manner. This can discourage certain adversaries when they realize the increased security and make it more difficult for them to carry out their plans. This was demonstrated by the ISPS officers shifting their attitudes from wanting to acquire information to protect their job and the port, all the way to using intelligence to take preventative measures to stop any incidents from occurring.
The nature of the threats in the Red Sea is that they are a combination of traditional and non-traditional security threats. OSINT is relevant in both types of threats and this study has demonstrated that OSINT can identify these trends and provide indicators and warnings for decision makers in the maritime security community. Individuals involved in port security and ISPS officers sought to raise the general security awareness to ultimately prevent any incidents from occurring. They also wished to use their resources in a proactive manner to deter any would-be criminals by increasing the difficulty for them to carry out any plans. This can be achieved using OSINT at a low-cost to acquire intelligence, much of which is freely available on the internet.
This paper is an exploration for open-source intelligence (OSINT) and its potential to identify maritime security threats in the Red Sea. It selected the port of Jeddah as a case study and demonstrated the potential of utilizing OSINT in identifying the threats to the port. This essay also explores the nature of the threats posed in the Red Sea environment and it also analyzes the attitudes of individuals involved in maritime security toward intelligence.
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research
Furthermore, the research has only touched the surface on what types of maritime security threats can be identified through OSI. It has mainly focused on the threats of sea robbery, smuggling, and sea attack without looking at piracy, migration, and many other types of incidents that come under the broad and ambiguous term of maritime security. Each different type of threat requires different methodologies to identify, and the analysis was only able to produce meaningful results for sea robbery with the creation of a global model. Thus, there is still much potential in exploring the identification of other threat types with different methodologies and data.
The findings from the analysis conducted for the general maritime traffic and subsequent further analysis of maritime threats and traffic through OSI have shown numerous insightful discoveries about the behaviors of certain ships and the environment within the Red Sea. These discoveries, shown in the findings, have helped to successfully identify where and when certain threat activities are likely to happen by comparing the threat events with the characteristics of normal traffic, including the locations of past maritime security incidents. Thus, it is recommended that more automatic and manual analysis is done on the maritime traffic and threats of specific regions with more historical and live intelligence data to further test and improve the capabilities of OSI to identify potential maritime security threats.